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NE of the most noteworthy decisions during the survey period was
the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in Maxey v. Freightliner
Corp.,I which discussed the impact in federal court of the Texas
Supreme Court's decision in Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls.2 In Maxey a truck
tractor manufactured by Freightliner overturned, causing the outside fuel
tanks to rupture and ignite. The accident killed its two passengers, and
their minor children brought a wrongful death action. The jury found that
the design of the fuel system on the truck tractor was defective. The trial
court awarded the Maxey children $150,000 in actual damages, but set
aside both the jury's finding of gross negligence by Freightliner and its
verdict of $10,000,000 in exemplary damages. The trial judge found, how-
ever, that if exemplary damages were held to be recoverable on appeal,
then $10,000,000 was an appropriate award.3 A divided panel of the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision,4 and the court granted a rehear-
ing en banc.5 Following the grant of rehearing, the Texas Supreme Court
decided Burk Royalty. In Burk Royalty the central issue on appeal was the
standard that an appellate court should apply to the review of a jury find-
ing of gross negligence. 6 The supreme court first comprehensively re-
viewed the development in Texas of the gross negligence concept. The
court concluded that the proper test for gross negligence was that set forth
in Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Shuford:7
Gross negligence, to be the ground for exemplary damages, should
be that entire want of care which would raise the belief that the act or
omission complained of was the result of a conscious indifference to
the rights or welfare of the person or persons to be affected by it.8
B.A., Kansas State University; J.D., Southern Methodist University; Attorney at
Law, Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal, Dallas, Texas.
1. 665 F.2d 1367 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
2. 616 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1981).
3. Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 966' (N.D. Tex. 1978). For a discus-
sion of the Fifth Circuit's holding with respect to the amount of exemplary damages, see
infra text accompanying notes 161-68.
4. 623 F.2d 395, 400 (5th Cir. 1980).
5. 634 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1980) (rehearing was without oral argument).
6. 616 S.W.2d at 920-24.
7. 72 Tex. 165, 10 S.W. 408 (1888).
8. Id. at 170, 10 S.W. at 411 (emphasis in original).
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The supreme court then squarely rejected the "some care" appellate review
standard that had developed over the years,9 holding that the "no evi-
dence" standard should be applied in the review of gross negligence find-
ings just as it is applied to the review of other findings.' 0
The principal question I I at issue in Maxey on rehearing was whether
Burk Royalty changed only the appropriate standard of review or whether
it also changed the substantive law of gross negligence. Freightliner ar-
gued that Burk Royalty made no change in substantive law, but altered
only the Texas procedural rules applicable to reviewing directed verdicts
and judgments notwithstanding the verdict. Accordingly, the manufac-
turer argued Burk Royalty had no Erie application to the federal court,
and the federal court should apply its own standard of review as set out in
Boeing Co. v. Shipman.12 The nine dissenting and concurring judges of
the court agreed with Freightliner.' 3 The fourteen-judge majority dis-
agreed, however, holding that the Texas Supreme Court in Burk Royalty
"established a uniform Texas definition of gross negligence, and rejected
the 'some care' test theretofore often applied by Texas courts in gross neg-
ligence cases, as well as by the district court and the panel majority in the
case sub judice." 14
After reviewing the development of the Shuford gross negligence defini-
tion, the majority concluded that a "some care" test had been engrafted
upon that definition by decisions subsequent to Shuford.'5 In particular,
the court cited Sheffield Division, Armco Steel Corp. v. Jones16 as adding
that as a matter of substantive law, evidence of "some care" by the defend-
ant necessarily precludes a finding of "that entire want of care" contained
in the Shuford definition. 17 The Fifth Circuit read Burk Royalty as re-
jecting Sheffield in its entirety, including the "bright line" concept that
there is either entire want of care or there is some care.' 8 To the Fifth
Circuit it appeared that the Texas Supreme Court had opted for a "more
rigorous analysis: rather than simply inquiring whether the defendant ex-
9. 616 S.W.2d at 922. The "some care" test was most clearly articulated in Sheffield
Div., Armco Steel Corp. v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 825, 829 (Tex. 1964), which the Burk Royalty
decision expressly overruled.
10. 616 S.W.2d at 920.
11. In addition to the court's determination as to the amount of exemplary damages, it
also approved the trial court's conclusion that Texas courts, when faced with the issue,
would hold that exemplary damages are recoverable in strict liability cases. The court did
not feel bound, under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), to a holding to that
effect in Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), but found "nothing in Texas law [that] would justify recognition of an automatic bar
to awards of exemplary damages in all products liability cases." 665 F.2d at 1371 n.4.
12. 411 F.2d 365, 373-76 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc) (the substantial evidence test).
13. 665 F.2d at 1379-86.
14. Id. at 1371. Interestingly enough, the phrase "some care" does not appear at all in
the district court's opinion.
15. ld at 1372.
16. 376 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1964) (workmen's compensation action for exemplary
damages).
17. 665 F.2d at 1372.
18. Id. at 1374.
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ercised some care, the proper focus is on the question whether, in light of
all of the surrounding circumstances, the requisite mental state is
shown."' 9 The "requisite mental state," the Fifth Circuit concluded, is a
"conscious indifference" by the defendant to the plaintiffs rights, welfare,
and safety.20 Thus, the court reversed and remanded Maxey to the district
court to reexamine the facts in light of both the substantive principles of
Burk Royalty and the review standard of Boeing.
The dissenting and concurring opinions in Maxey forcefully argued that
Burk Royalty did nothing to the substantive standard of gross negligence,
but established only the appropriate standard by which appellate courts
may review jury findings of gross negligence. 2' More particularly, the dis-
sent argued that the Texas court merely "struck down the 'some care' pro-
cedural rule, substituting the standard Texas 'no evidence' mode of
review."' 22 It pointed out that the Texas court's only express rejection of
the "some care" rule, or of Sheffield, was in the statement: "[w]e disap-
prove the use of the 'some care' test in determining legal sufficiency points
and overrule those cases applying it.' '23 The dissent in Maxey also argued
that Sheffield adopted its definition of gross negligence from Shuford and
that the definitions of the substantive law are identical.24
The Maxey majority likely read more into Burk Royalty than the
supreme court's opinion can support. As presently composed, the Fifth
Circuit court may reflect more the views of the minority than the major-
ity.25 The impact of Maxey may be seen, however, in its application in
later cases. In the companion case to Maxey, Broussard v. Southern Pacfic
Transportation Co. ,26 the full court reversed a partial summary judgment
in favor of the defendant based upon a record that reflected that the de-
19. Id
20. Id
21. Id at 1380 (Garwood, J., concurring) (quoting Burk Royalty, 616 S.W.2d at 920).
Judge Garwood rejected the majority's notion that Burk Royalty totally repudiated the
"some care" rule or formulated a new definition of gross negligence. Instead, he expressed
the view that Burk Royalty simply offered some "clarification" of the rule. Id at 1381.
22. Id. at 1383 (Gee, J., dissenting).
23. Burk Royalty, 616 S.W.2d at 922.
24. 665 F.2d at 1385 (Gee, .J., dissenting). The dissent noted, however, that Burk Roy-
alty disapproved the "arcane distinction between passive and active conduct" carried for-
ward in Sheffield. Id at 1385 n.5. Judge Garwood, in his concurring opinion, agreed with
Judge Gee's interpretation that Burk Royalty made no express repudiation of the substantive
law of gross negligence. Judge Garwood, however, did believe that Burk Royalty implied
"some clarification and qualification of the 'some care' doctrine as a substantive test for
determining whether a given act or course of conduct constitutes gross negligence." To
Judge Garwod, Burk Royalty clarified this doctrine by rejecting an overly mechanical appli-
cation of the "some care" test, without regard to the defendant's state of mind, or to all of
the surrounding facts and circumstances. Id. at 1379 (Garwood, J., concurring).
25. The Maxey opinion was rendered prior to the split of the Fifth Circuit into two
circuits. An analysis of the composition of the court as currently constituted suggests that
the case might have been decided differently had it been heard by the present court. Of the
thirteen active judges now on the court, five are from the Maxey majority and five are from
the minority. In addition, Judge Higginbotham, in whose court Maxey was tried and whose
review of the jury's gross negligence finding was reversed, has since been appointed to the
Fifth Circuit.
26. 665 F.2d 1387 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
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fendant had exercised some care.27 The Fifth Circuit stated that the in-
quiry was not whether the defendant's conduct evidenced some care, but
whether it demonstrated a conscious indifference to the rights of others.28
The court's holding prompted the dissenters to criticize pointedly the rea-
soning that "where 'some care' is shown there still may be 'an entire want
of care.' "29
In Schwartz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 30 three justices from the Maxey
majority affirmed an award of exemplary damages based upon a jury find-
ing of gross negligence. Schwartz's significance lies in its approval of the
gross negligence definition expressed in Burk Royalty.3' Ironically, the
Schwartz court characterized the instruction as the "newly reapproved
Shuford definition," 32 despite the fact that the definition has been in use in
this state for many years and was unaffected by Burk Royalty.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Gardner v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 33
should be noted. The court logically concluded that since the jury found
the defendant to be not negligent in any of the respects contended, the trial
judge properly directed a verdict for the defendant on the issue of gross
negligence. The court stated that "[u]nder the rigorous tests outlined in
Burk Royalty, the jury's finding of ordinary care necessarily precludes the
inference of conscious indifference needed to establish gross neglience. '' 34
II. SETTLEMENT, RELEASE, CONTRIBUTION, AND INDEMNITY
Several noteworthy cases were decided during the survey period that
affect the complex interplay of settlements and releases with the rights of
contribution and indemnity between joint tortfeasors. The most significant
case is Cypress Creek Utility Service Co. v. Muller.35 In that case the Texas
Supreme Court overruled the application of the Bradshaw v. Baylor Uni-
versily36 "one satisfaction rule," in comparative negligence actions in
27. Id at 1390.
28. Id at 1389.
29. Id. at 1390 (Gee, J., dissenting). Judge Gee stated: "I fancy that such suggestions
demonstrate why the law is viewed by laymen as mysterious." Id
30. 669 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1982).
31. The court approved a jury instruction that gross negligence is "'that entire want of
care which would raise the belief that the act or omission complained of was the result of a
conscious indifference to the right or welfare of the person or persons to be affected by it.'"
Id. at 1092-93 (quoting Burk Royalty, 616 S.W.2d at 920). This standard is likewise used in
the jury instructions in I STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATrERN JURY CHARGES § 3.11, at
70 (1969).
32. 669 F.2d at 1093.
33. 675 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1982).
34. Id at 661. The court's frequent reference to "the rigorous test" must be read with
reference to whose ox is being gored. It seems clear that jury findings of gross negligence
will be more difficult to overcome at the trial court level and more easily sustained on ap-
peal. See, e.g., Poole v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 638 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [Ist
Dist.] 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.) (judgment n.o.v, appropriate only if there is no evidence of
probative force on which jury could base finding of gross negligence). Summary judgment
in favor of defendants on gross neglience issues should be rare indeed.
35. 640 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. 1982).
36. 126 Tex. 99, 84 S.W.2d 703 (1935). Bradshaw stated that an injured party is entitled
[Vol. 37
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which the jury apportions a percentage of negligence to the settling
tortfeasor.
In Cypress Creek two passengers, Muller and Seyen, were riding in an
automobile driven by Carroll when the vehicle struck a pile of dirt left on
the road by Cypress and careened into the oncoming lane of traffic where
it struck an automobile driven by Rowden. Muller and Seyen, in one ac-
tion, sued Carroll, seeking recovery for the injuries sustained in the colli-
sion between the Carroll and Rowden vehicles. Rowden sued Carroll and
Cypress in a separate action, and the two suits were subsequently consoli-
dated. Carroll filed a cross-action against Cypress, seeking recovery for
injuries and property damage, but did not seek contribution. On the other
hand, Carroll sought contribution from Rowden but not affirmative relief.
Cypress sought contribution from Rowden but not from Carroll.
Prior to trial Rowden settled with Carroll for $25,000. Cypress elected
to take a dollar for dollar credit for this amount to be applied against any
judgment Rowden might recover against Cypress. During jury delibera-
tions Seyen settled with Carroll for $7,500. The jury found Cypress and
Carroll negligent and apportioned the negligence eighty percent to Cypress
and twenty percent to Carroll. The jury awarded $730,000 to Muller,
$9,556.97 to Rowden, and $1,500 to Seyen. The trial court refused to allow
Cypress a dollar for dollar credit for either settlement. Instead, the court
reduced by twenty percent the jury award to Rowden and Seyen and en-
tered judgment against Cypress for the balance. Both the court of appeals
and the supreme court affirmed. 37
The supreme court first reviewed the development of the law of contri-
bution from common law through the enactment of article 2212, by which
the legislature abrogated the common law principle of no contribution and
allowed joint tortfeasors to apportion between them the damages to be
paid to the victim of the tort.38 The court then noted the two methods of
dealing with the situation in which one or more of the joint tortfeasors
settles with the plaintiff before trial.39 The first method was embodied in
the "one satisfaction rule" articulated in Bradshaw.4° Under this rule the
nonsettling tortfeasor received a dollar for dollar credit for the amount
paid by the settling tortfeasor. The second method of dealing with settle-
to but one satisfaction for his injuries, even though more than one party contributed to those
injuries. Id at 104, 84 S.W.2d at 705.
37. 624 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1981), a f'd, 640 S.W.2d 860(Tex. 1982).
38. 640 S.W.2d at 861-64; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971). The
statute provides:
Any person against whom, with one or more others, a judgment is rendered
in any suit on an action arising out of, or based on tort ... shall, upon pay-
ment of said judgment, have a right of action against his co-defendant or co-
defendants and may recover from such a sum equal to the proportion of all of
the defendants named in said judgment rendered to the whole amount of saidjudgment.
Id
39. 640 S.W.2d at 862-63.
40. 126 Tex. at 1. 84 S.W.2d at 705.
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ment by less than all joint tortfeasors was designed to remedy the situation
in which the plaintiff settled with one defendant for a nominal sum and
then utilized that defendant's help to secure a large judgment against the
remaining defendant. Thus, in Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins4' the
court held that the release of one tortfeasor released the remaining
tortfeasors for the settling tortfeasor's proportional amount of the resulting
judgment.42
The common practice, in view of the two concurrently approved meth-
ods of dealing with settling tortfeasors, has been for the trial court to per-
mit the nonsettling tortfeasors to seek a Palestine Contractors
proportionate reduction. The court, however, would allow the election of
a Bradshaw credit if the payment of the nonsettling defendants' propor-
tionate shares would result in the plaintiffs receiving more than the
amount of damages found by the jury. This election placed the nonsettling
defendants in an advantageous position and, from the plaintiff's perspec-
tive, discouraged settlement.
In 1973 the legislature enacted article 2212a, which provides that in neg-
ligence actions contribution is permitted among joint tortfeasors in propor-
tion to the percentage of negligent fault the jury finds.43 Section 2 of the
statute delineates how a settlement by one or more tortfeasors affects these
contribution rights.4" If the settling tortfeasor is not a party to the action at
the time the case goes to the jury, so that his negligence is not submitted,
the remaining defendants receive a Bradshaw dollar for dollar credit for
the amount of the settlement.45 If the settling tortfeasor is a party to the
action at the time it goes to the jury, so that his degree of negligence is
determined, the nonsettling defendants receive a Palestine-like pro rata
credit.4
6
In Cypress Creek the nonsettling defendant argued that it should be al-
lowed the Bradshaw credit despite the fact that the jury had determined
the negligence of the settling defendant, Carroll. Cypress argued that the
legislature did not intend to remove from the nonsettling defendant the
election to choose either the pro tanto or pro rata reduction. Cypress re-
lied heavily on the decisions of the court of civil appeals in Deal v.
Madison47 and Columbia Engineering International, Ltd v. Dorman.48
Moreover, Cypress reasoned, the application of the pro rata reduction
against the wishes of the defendant would result in the same collusive set-
tlement abuse that Palestine Contractors was designed to discourage. Fi-
nally, Cypress argued that to disallow the dollar for dollar credit in every
41. 386 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1964).
42. Id. at 773.
43. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1982).
44. Id. §2.
45. Id. § 2(d).
46. Id. § 2(e).
47. 576 S.W.2d 409, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (judgment
againt nonsettling defendant reduced by amount of settlements under § 2(d)).
48. 602 S.W.2d 72, 79 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (one satisfac-
tion rule applied despite jury determination of settling defendant's negligence).
[Vol. 37
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instance would result in unjust enrichment when the total of the judgment
and settlement amounts exceeded the damages found by the jury.
The supreme court rejected each of Cypress's arguments in favor of fol-
lowing the plain language of the statute. The court declined to provide an
election when none is found in the statute. It observed that the trend in
recent years is not to attempt to combat the use of unfair trial tactics, such
as the collusive settlement, with changes in substantive law.4 9 Accord-
ingly, the court expressly overruled that application of the Bradshaw rule
in any case in which article 2212a, section 2(e) applies.50
The result in Cypress Creek seems unquestionably correct. The lan-
guage of article 2212a, sections 2(d) and (e) is clear, and the court properly
declined to substitute its own judgment for that of the legislature. Cypress
Creek signals a necessary change in tactics by defendants in cases gov-
erned by article 2212a in which one or more defendants have settled. In
many instances the nonsettling defendant will have to elect whether to
keep the settling defendant in the case.5 '
The court of appeals in McAllen Kentucky Fried Chicken No. 1, Inc. v.
Leal52 discussed this tactical decision that often faces the nonsettling de-
fendant. The court held, as in Cypress Creek, that the nonsettling defend-
ant must exercise its "strategic option" either to take the dollar for dollar
credit by dismissing the claim for contribution, or to submit the issue of the
settling defendant's negligence to the jury.53 Thus, having made the elec-
tion to hold the settling defendant in the action, the court did not allow the
nonsettling defendant in this case to request later the dollar reduction.5 4
In determining the credit allowed to a nonsettling tortfeasor, it becomes
important to consider the nature of the moneys paid by the settling
tortfeasor, and whether the settling party is one from whom contribution
may be had under the statutes. Those issues were important in a number
of cases decided during the survey period. In Howard v. General Cable
Corp. 55 the Fifth Circuit pointed out that under Texas law the settlement
and the judgment awarded must represent "common damages" before a
court will allow a Bradshaw credit.56 The court in Howard allowed the
credit, but the case illustrates the problems that may arise in an action in
which the plaintiff seeks exemplary and compensatory damages and the
49. 640 S.W.2d at 866. The court suggested that a permissible safeguard against collu-
sive settlements is to inform the jury of "any settlement which might cause a distorted pic-
ture of the parties' true interests." Id at 866.
50. The court expressly did not overrule Bradshaw with respect to cases in which art.
2212a, § 2(e) does not apply. Deal Y. Madison, and Columbia Eng'g Int'l, Ltd v. Dorman,
were disapproved by the Cypress Creek court to the extent they are inconsistent with the
court's opinion. 640 S.W.2d at 865-66.
51. In some instances, of course, the nonsettling defendant, like Cypress Creek in the
main case, will have no election to make and will be left with the pro rata reduction pro-
vided by art. 2212a, § 2(e).
52. 627 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
53. Id at 485.
54. Id
55. 674 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1982).
56. Id. at 358.
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settlement agreement does not apportion the settlement fund between the
two types of damages.
In Texas Industries, Inc. Y. Lucas57 the court of appeals held that an
employer who was immune from liability under the Texas Worker's Com-
pensation Act 58 was not a "settling party" for purposes of a pro rata reduc-
tion of the damages awarded.5 9 The defendants did not seek contribution
or indemnification from the employer, but did seek to have the employer's
negligence submitted to the jury for the purpose of determining an appro-
priate proportionate reduction in the damages awarded. The court of ap-
peals, considering the question one of first impression, held that, because
the defendants had no cause of action for contribution against the em-
ployer, they were not entitled to the credit or reduction provided by article
2212a. 60
Two cases addressed the unsettled issue of the right to contribution of a
party liable under a strict liability theory from a party whose negligence
contributes to the plaintiffs injury. In Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp. 61
the court did not reach the question of a strictly liable party's right of con-
tribution from a negligent party under the facts of the case, 62 but it noted
that the question has not been decided and that the supreme court in Gen-
eral Motors Corp. v. Simmons63 has called for further legislative study of
the issue.64 The court of appeals in Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co. ,65 how-
ever, squarely faced the issue and held that article 2212 permits contribu-
tion between negligent and strictly liable tortfeasors. 66 The court cited
General Motors Corp. v. Simmons as authority.67
III. MALPRACTICE
Two decisions from courts of appeals during the survey period followed
the Texas precedent that a physician is not liable in damages to the parents
of a healthy child conceived after the unsuccessful performance of sterili-
zation.68 The Dallas court in Sutkin v. Beck 69 concluded that damages re-
57. 634 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ).
58. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306 (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1982-1983).
59. 634 S.W.2d at 756-57.
60. Id at 757.
61. 633 S.W.2d 553, 561 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982), aj'd, 26 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 259 (March 12, 1983).
62. Bonniwell is worthy of study for its discussion of collateral estoppel and the applica-
tion of that principle to claims for contribution.
63. 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
64. Id at 863.
65. 632 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1982, writ granted). The decision is also
noteworthy for its discussion of when a party who is not named in a release is "otherwise
specifically identified" so as to benefit from the release. Id at 378-81; see McMillen v.
Klingensmith, 467 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tex. 1971) (setting forth requirements of full release).
66. 632 S.W.2d at 389.
67. Id
68. See, e.g., Silva v. Howe, 608 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1980, writ
ref d n.r.e.); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref d
n.r.e.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974); Hays v. Hall, 477 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland), rev'don other grounds, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972).
69. 629 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
[Vol. 37
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suiting from rearing a healthy child are overly speculative. 70 The Fort
Worth court in Hickman v. Myers,71 on the other hand, adopted a public
policy stand in reaching the same result. The court in Hickman noted that
Texas courts have determined that "public sentiment" recognizes that the
benefits to parents of a healthy child outweigh the economic loss of rearing
and educating the child.72 Though the court recognized that society's best
interests require that physicians be held to a standard of competence and
that liability be imposed when physicians are negligent in the treatment of
their patients, the court held that to impose liability upon a doctor for the
support of a healthy child would go well beyond the scope of his duty to
his patient. 73
Based upon Stukin, Hickman, and the cases cited therein, no doubt ex-
ists that, absent legislative action or Texas Supreme Court decision, no
liability arises from the birth of a healthy but unwanted child. It is
equally clear that the parents of a physically deformed child, born as a
result of a physician's negligent sterilization or diagnosis, may recover
damages measured by the cost of the care and treatment of the child.74
Until the decision of the Dallas court of appeals in Nelson v. Krusen ,75
however, no Texas court had considered the existence of a cause of action
for "wrongful life" on behalf of a deformed child.
In Nelson the parents sought the diagnosis of the defendant physician as
to whether the mother was a carrier of Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy so
that a decision could be made whether to terminate the mother's preg-
nancy. Based upon the physician's favorable diagnosis the parents did not
terminate the pregnancy, but the child that was born was afflicted by the
disease. The parents and child asserted that the physician's diagnosis was
negligently provided. After affirming the trial court's summary judgment
against the parents on limitations, the appeals court examined the question
of whether the child could maintain an action for "wrongful life." The
court found no support for such a cause of action in Jacobs v. Theimer,'7 6
which recognized a cause of action on behalf of the parents of a deformed
or defective child.77 The court cited with approval an Ohio federal district
court decision holding that Jacobs did not give rise to a cause of action on
behalf of the child.78 The Nelson court concluded that unless the supreme
court or the Texas Legislature creates such a cause of action, trial courts
should grant summary judgment denying relief to the child.79
70. Id at 132.
71. 632 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
72. Id at 870.
73. Id at 871-72.
74. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975) (distinguishing between cause
of action for wrongful birth and life of healthy child and one for expenditures related to
birth of deformed child).
75. 635 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
76. 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
77. Id at 850.
78. Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654, 656 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
79. 635 S.W.2d at 586. The child in Nelson sought damages of two sorts: (1) those
1983]
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The Fifth Circuit's decision in Haught v. Maceluch8° is important both
in the malpractice area and the negligence field in general, because of the
court's discussion of the uninjured bystander rule under Texas law. The
facts in the case presented a particularly egregious course of action by the
physician attending a mother in labor, resulting in a tragically defective
child. The plaintiff-mother sought recovery for the mental anguish she
suffered because of the birth of the defective child. The trial court set aside
the jury's award of $118,000 on the ground that Texas law did not permit
recovery. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the Texas Supreme Court
would have permitted the recovery and reinstated the jury award. 8'
After reviewing prior Texas cases 82 and concluding that Texas law does
recognize an uninjured bystander cause of action in some instances,8 3 the
court reasoned that Texas courts would "follow the modern rule of mea-
suring bystander recovery according to the general negligence principle of
foreseeability. '' 84 The court held that foreseeability in a bystander case
would be determined by the three-factor test formulated by the California
court in Dillon v. Legg85 : first, whether the plaintiff was located near the
scene of the event; second, whether the shock resulted from contemporane-
ous observation of the event as contrasted to learning of the event from
others; and, third, whether the plaintiff and victim were closely related.
8 6
Only the second factor was troublesome in the context of the birth of the
distressed child. The court ultimately concluded that although the plaintiff
was unconscious at the time of delivery and did not learn of the child's
permanent disabilities until some days later, the plaintiff nevertheless
could be said to have had an experiential perception of the event and to
have suffered shocking thoughts about the child's safety.87 It should be
noted that, although the court's analysis of the Texas law of the uninjured
bystander cause of action is important, the court stressed the necessity to
examine every case on its own facts in determining foreseeability.
88
Two additional cases are worthy of brief note. The Texas Supreme
arising from having been born; and (2) those related to the care and treatment of the defect
or deformity. The court properly rejected the former as too speculative, but did not offer
any rationale for denying the second category of damages except to say that Jacobs v.
Theimer does not authorize such a claim. In this respect the Nelson court somewhat begged
the issue.
80. 681 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1982).
81. Id. at 306.
82. The court reviewed Kaufman v. Miller, 414 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1967), and Landreth
v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ).
83. 681 F.2d at 297-98 n.6.
84. Id at 298.
85. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
86. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The court recognized a fourth
element under Texas law: the distress must manifest itself through physical injury. The
court noted the liberal application of this requirement and held that plaintiff's depression,
weight gain, nervousness and nightmares satisfied the requirement. 681 F.2d at 299 n.9.
87. 681 F.2d at 300-02.
88. Id at 300. See Sanchez v. Schindler, 626 S.W.2d 871, 873-74 (Tex. Ct. App.-
Corpus Christi 1981), reversed, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 353 (April 27, 1983) decided during the
survey period. Although the court of civil appeals stated that it would apply the more per-
missive "contemporaneous perception" test of Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ), the plaintiff-mother who was not at the scene of the
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Court held in Roark v. Allen 89 that the absence of expert testimony in an
area in which laymen cannot infer that a breach of the appropriate stan-
dard of care proximately caused the plaintiffs injury required reversal of
the jury's award.90 In addition, the court held that the doctrine of in-
formed consent applies only to medical practices yet to be performed and
is inapplicable retroactively when the patient has already undergone the
proposed treatment.9 ' In Schepps v. Presbyterian Hospital92 the Dallas
court of appeals rejected the reasoning of an earlier federal court decision
and held the notice provision of the Medical Liability and Insurance Im-
provement Act of Texas9 3 to be mandatory and not merely directory.
94
IV. TRADE SECRETS
The use or disclosure of trade secrets or other confidential information
gave rise to several decisions during the survey period. In Vaquero Petro-
leum Co. v. Simmons" the plaintiff sought to impose a constructive trust
upon properties the defendants acquired through information they re-
ceived during a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff. The defendants,
however, acquired the property after terminating that relationship. Al-
though the court concluded that the defendants committed no wrong
under the facts presented, it strongly suggested that a constructive trust
would not be available to remedy the improper use of confidential infor-
mation if the fiduciary relationship had terminated prior to the use. 96 The
court noted that a constructive trust is a remedy that should be used with
caution, 97 and distinguished cases the plaintiff cited in support of the re-
quested relief as cases involving conduct in breach of a then existing
fiduciary relationship. 98 It appears, however, that the proper rule should
be that if a party gains information during the existence of a fiduciary
relationship, and the use of that information during such relationship
would give rise to the imposition of a constructive trust for the benefit of
the beneficiary, then a constructive trust should similarly be available to
accident and only heard that her son was injured in an accident was not allowed to recover
for emotional distress. The supreme court, however, overruled the long-standing "pecuniary
loss" rule and allowed recovery for emotional distress under the Texas Wrongful Death
Statute.
89. 633 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. 1982).
90. Id. at 809.
91. Id at 808.
92. 638 S.W.2d 156, 157-58 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, writ granted).
93. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (Vernon Supp. 1982).
94. 638 S.W.2d at 157-58. The court rejected Burdett v. Methodist Hosp., 484 F. Supp.
1338 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
95. 636 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
96. Id. at 767-68.
97. Id. at 767; see Pope v. Garrett, 147 Tex. 18, 25, 211 S.W.2d 559, 562 (1948) (con-
structive trust imposed upon heirs who prevented intestate from executing will).
98. 636 S.W.2d at 767. The court distinguished the following cases: Hunter v. Shell Oil
Co., 198 F.2d 485, 487 (5th Cir. 1952); International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368
S.W.2d 567, 576-77 (Tex. 1963); Omohundro v. Matthews, 161 Tex. 367, 371, 341 S.W.2d
401, 404 (1960); Smith v. Bolin, 153 Tex. 486, 490, 271 S.W.2d 93, 95 (1954); Fitz-Gerald v.
Hull, 150 Tex. 39, 41-45, 237 S.W.2d 256, 257-58 (1951); MacDonald v. Follett, 142 Tex. 616,
622, 180 S.W.2d 334, 338 (1944).
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remedy the misuse of such information after the relationship terminates. 99
As discussed below, even in the absence of an express contract, the law
restricts a former employee's use of information obtained in the course of a
confidential relationship. 100 Even more so should a person who subjects
himself to the restrictions placed upon a fiduciary be subject to the same
remedies, irrespective of whether the fiduciary relationship exists at the
time the breach of the restrictions occurs.
Two cases decided during the survey period highlight the need for re-
form of the unique Texas rule that unfairly and unnecessarily restricts the
use of information gained by a person as a result of a confidential relation-
ship. In Reading & Bates Construction Co. v. O'Donnell0 1 and Sikes v.
McGraw-Edison Co. 102 the courts applied the Texas rule that one who ac-
quires confidential or trade secret information during the existence of a
confidential relationship may not turn it to his own use even after the in-
formation is later made public and is available for use by the rest of the
world. 103
If a good reason for such a rule ever existed, no good reason exists for its
continuance. Logic and common sense dictate that a party who is the ben-
eficiary of a restriction upon the disclosure of such information by another
party, whether arising by contract or operation of law, loses the benefit of
such restriction by making such information public. It is hoped that the
supreme court will abolish the rule applied in Reading and Sikes at the
first opportunity.
Additionally, Sikes should be noted for its rejection of the defendant's
argument that a new product idea was at issue and, as such, was distin-
guishable from a trade secret.1°4 Defendant premised its argument upon
Richter v. Westab, Inc. ,105 which made such a distinction under the facts of
that case.1°6 The Sikes court, however, found Richter factually distin-
guishable and contrary to Texas law.'0 7
99. Clearly, if the former fiduciary is under no restriction with respect to the informa-
tion (e.g., the beneficiary has affirmatively released the former fiduciary) then no "misuse"
of the information has occurred and no relief of any sort is appropriate.
100. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text; see also K & G Oil Tool & Serv. Co.
v. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., 158 Tex. 594, 602, 314 S.W.2d 782, 787 (1958) (disclosure of
trade secret in wrongful disregard of confidential relationship); Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158
Tex. 566, 576, 314 S.W.2d 763, 770 (1958) (in confidential relation of employment, injured
party not required to rely upon an express agreement to hold trade secret in confidence).
101. 627 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
102. 655 F.2d 731 (5th Cir.), on rehearing, 671 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
3488, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1369 (1982).
103. Sikes, 665 F.2d at 734; Reading, 627 S.W.2d at 242. The Texas court relied on Atlas
Bradford Co. v. Tuboscope Co., 378 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1964, no writ), and
the federal court relied on Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 314 S.W.2d 763, cert. de-
nied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958).
104. 665 F.2d at 733-34.
105. 529 F.2d 896 (6th Cir. 1976).
106. Id at 900.




Two cases decided during the survey period make it clear that a party
required to show malice in a libel action must present direct evidence of
the author's state of mind. In Foster v. Upchurch, °108 a venue case decided
by the Texas Supreme Court, 09 and Times-Mirror Co. v. Harden,' 10 de-
cided by the Eastland court of appeals, the plaintiffs sought to prove mal-
ice by relying upon the inaccuracies and internal inconsistencies in the
subject articles themselves. In both cases the courts held that the contents
of the articles alone do not show the author's state of mind."' As the
Foster court stated: "The internal inconsistencies of [the defendant's] arti-
cle, standing alone, do not meet [the plaintiffis] burden of proof on actual
malice. More subjective evidence is required.""12
The Fifth Circuit considered the issue of sufficient proof of malice in
Texas in the context of an employer's qualified privilege not to disclose
statements he made regarding an employee. In Gaines v. Cuna Mutual
Insurance Society' ' 3 the federal court first observed that Texas cases have
created a qualified privilege that protects an employer's statements con-
cerning an employee if the employer makes the statements in the course, or
as a result, of an investigation of the employee's conduct. 1 4 The court
noted that the privilege is based upon the public policy that "recognizes
the need for the free communication of information to protect business
and personal interests."'"15 To overcome the privilege the plaintiff must
prove malice." 16
In Gaines the plaintiff argued that the employer maliciously published
the alleged libelous letter, but offered no direct evidence of the author's
state of mind. Although decided well after the decision of the Texas
108. 624 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. 1981).
109. The court issued perhaps its strongest call to date for the modernization of the Texas
venue laws. The court stated:
Numerous calls for venue reform have gone unheeded in the past, largely be-
cause of resistance from those who are familiar with the complexities of our
venue laws and fear the uncertainties of any substantial change. The increas-
ing time and expense of litigation, however, are making our current venue
laws an unreasonable burden on litigants, taxpayers, and the judicial system
as a whole.
Id at 566, n.2.
110. 628 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
I 1. Foster, 624 S.W.2d at 566; Times-Mirror, 628 S.W.2d at 865.
112. 624 S.W.2d at 566.
113. 681 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1982).
114. Id at 985; see Bergman v. Oshman's Sporting Goods, Inc., 594 S.W.2d 814 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ); Ryder Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Latham, 593 S.W.2d 334 (Tex.
Civ. App.-EI Paso 1979, writ reed n.r.e.); Butler v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 458 S.W.2d
510 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Duncantell v. Universal Life Ins. Co.,
446 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ retd n.r.e.); Buck v. Sav-
age, 323 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, writ refd n.r.e.); see also Houston v.
Grocers Supply Co., 625 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th District] 1981, no writ)
(holding that statements made by personnel director concerning alleged theft by employee
entitled to a qualified privilege).
115. 681 F.2d at 986.
116. See supra note 113 and cases cited therein.
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Supreme Court in Foster and the decision in Times-Mirror, the Fifth Cir-
cuit cited neither decision. Nevertheless, the federal court's reasoning was
consistent with the two recent Texas cases in concluding that the plaintiffs
circumstantial evidence of actual malice was insufficient to raise a question
of fact."17 The Fifth Circuit could have reached the same holding, and
shortened its opinion, by relying on the Foster and Times-Mirror decisions.
None of the three cases discussed above gives guidance as to what evi-
dence is sufficient to establish the author's state of mind short of testimony
from the author himself. Direct evidence of the-author's knowledge of the
statement's falsity is certainly sufficient, but circumstantial evidence of
such fact, however plentiful, appears inadequate. The failure to investi-
gate the truth of the statement does not constitute malice, 118 and the mere
reduction to writing of a statement that could have been made orally is no
evidence of malice. 19
VI. DUTY
Although it is a venue case, the decision of the Austin court of appeals in
Bernard Johnson, Inc. v. Continental Constructors, Inc. 120 is a case of first
impression in this state on the issue of whether a supervising architect or
engineer owes a duty in tort to a prime contractor, when the architect's or
engineer's negligence causes the prime contractor economic damage. Con-
tinental Constructors built a bulkhead at Lake Livingston, Texas, under a
contract with the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department. The contract
called for construction in accordance with plans and specifications pre-
pared by Bernard Johnson and gave Bernard Johnson certain powers and
duties as "the architect/engineer." The court construed the contractor's
petition to allege a claim in contract and negligence, stating that the archi-
tect had certain contractual duties which he breached and also that the
architect was negligent in designing and administering the project. 12' The
court joined the contract claim with the claim in negligence, reasoning that
a party who fails to perform a contractual obligation with care and skill
may be liable for negligence as well as for breach of contract. 122 Because
117. 681 F.2d at 987.
118. Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc. v. O'Neil, 456 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tex. 1970); El Paso Times,
Inc. v. Trexler, 447 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. 1969).
119. 681 F.2d at 988.
120. 630 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.).
121. Id at 367.
122. Id. at 369. The court relied upon Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Scharrenbeck, 146
Tex. 153, 157, 204 S.W.2d 508, 510 (1947). The court's observation is a dictum to the case,
however, because Bernard Johnson was not a contracting party to the bulkhead contract.
The notion that a negligently performed contractual obligation gives rise to a claim in tort as
well as in contract, as Scharrenbeck suggests, is frequently utilized in an effort to obtain
punitive damages in cases which are truly contract cases, thus circumventing decisions such
as A.L. Carter Lumber Co. v. Saide,. 140 Tex. 523, 526, 168 S.W.2d 629, 631 (1943), which
hold that exemplary damages are not allowed for breach of contract. Id It is submitted that
Scharrenbeck's commingling of tort and contract concepts is unneccesary, unsound, and
should be abandoned. This principle of Scharrenbeck was indirectly undermined by the
Texas Supreme Court's decision during the last survey period in Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alex-
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the architect was not in privity of contract with the contractor, however,
the court was unwilling to find that the architect had a contractual duty to
the contractor. 23
The court then reviewed the question of whether the supervising archi-
tect owes a duty at common law. The court noted that some jurisdictions
impose upon the architect a duty of ordinary care in favor of the contrac-
tor,' 24 but the court found such cases to be "lacking in logical analysis."' 125
The court also rejected the contractor's argument that as a matter of policy
the status of architects imposes upon them a duty of care to the contrac-
tor.' 26 The court, therefore, concluded that the contractor's allegations set
forth no cause of action against the architect. 27
The dissent in Bernard Johnson noted the lack of any controlling Texas
authority and the split of authority in other jurisdictions. 28 Unlike the
majority, Chief Judge Phillips found those cases upholding an architect's
duty to a contractor to be the better reasoned. 129 Judge Phillips found
support for his decision to join the "pro-duty" line of cases in the earlier
Texas appeals court opinion in 10.L Systems, Inc. v. Cleveland.130
Although the Texas Supreme Court refused the writ in Bernard Johnson
on the basis of no reversible error, the court of appeals was only deciding
venue in the action. Nevertheless, the duty issue which was decided by the
court of appeals is an important one. It is hoped that the supreme court
will seize an early opportunity to provide guidance to the development of
the law in this area.
VII. RES IPSA LOQUITUR
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence that allows for a
finding of negligence when the circumstances surrounding the incident in
question constitute sufficient circumstantial evidence to support such a
finding.1'1 Accordingly, cases discussing the application of the doctrine
may be treated elsewhere in this survey issue. Nevertheless, since res ipsa
is so often considered a tort law rule, it is appropriate to mention here the
several cases decided during the survey period that illustrate the accor-
dian-like manner in which courts have expanded and contracted the scope
of the res ipsa doctrine.
ander, 622 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981), in which the court held that "a breach of [an] implied
covenant ... is an action sounding in contract and will not support recovery of exemplary
damages absent proof of an independent tort." Id at 571. See Laity, Mineral Resources,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 36 Sw. L.J. 185, 196 (1982), for a discussion of this case.
123. 630 S.W.2d at 370.
124. Id at 371.
125. Id
126. Id at 373-74.
127. Id at 375-76.
128. Id at 376.
129. Id
130. 615 S.W.2d 786, 790 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.)
(duty of reasonable care from architect to contractor).
131. See Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 251 (Tex. 1974).
1983]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
The beginning point for such an analysis is the supreme court's opinion
in Mobil Chemical Co. v. Bell.132 In Bell the court clearly restated the two
elements that must be present for application of the res ipsa doctrine:
"(1) the character of the accident is such that it would not ordinarily occur
in the absence of negligence; and (2) the instrumentality causing the injury
is shown to have been under the management and control of the defend-
ant."' 33 The court went on to note, however, that these requirements are
not rigid rules and must be reasonably applied to the facts of the given
case. 134
As might be expected in light of Bell, the cases during the survey period
that considered the application of the res ipsa doctrine are fact-oriented
and are helpful only to the practitioner who is faced with an analogous fact
situation. 135 The decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Marathon Oil
Co. v. Sterner 3 6 merits examination, however, for its restrictive applica-
tion of the doctrine. Briefly stated, the plaintiff was allegedly gassed while
repairing a large metal vessel on Marathon's premises. The plaintiff was
an employee of a contractor retained to perform the repair, but Marathon
was responsible for insuring that the vessel was safe to enter. Marathon
was to insure that all gas lines were closed, and each day before anyone
was permitted to enter the vessel a Marathon safety person was to check
for the presence of harmful gases by the use of an instrument known as a
sniffer. Although the Marathon safety person inspected and okayed the
vessel on the day in question, the plaintiff was overcome by gas while
working in the vessel and suffered resultant injury.
The case was tried to a jury on a res ipsa theory. The jury found for the
plaintiff on all issues and awarded $25,000 in damages. Marathon urged
on appeal that no evidence existed that the vessel was under the manage-
ment and control of Marathon or that the character of the accident was
such that it would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence. The
court of appeals affirmed, but the supreme court reversed and rendered
judgment.' 7 The higher court found no evidence that Marathon con-
trolled the vessel or that the accident was of the type that would not ordi-
narily occur absent negligence. 38
The supreme court's decision in Marathon Oil cannot be squared with
132. 517 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. 1974).
133. Id at 251.
134. Id.
135. See Jones v. Tarrant Util. Co., 638 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. 1982) (res ipsa loquitor held
applicable in situation involving water damage from storage tank leak); Sohio Pipeline Co.
v. Harmon, 627 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ) (res ipsa loquitur held
applicable in situation involving leak in oil pipeline valve); Smith v. Little, 626 S.W.2d 906
(Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ) (res ipsa loquitur held not applicable in situation in-
volving fire damage to apartment); Cuellar v. Garcia, 621 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1981, writ refd n.r.e.) (res ipsa loquitur held not applicable in situation involving
"runaway" automobile).
136. 632 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. 1982).
137. 624 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1981), rev'd, 632 S.W.2d 571
(Tex. 1982).
138. 632 S.W.2d at 573-74.
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the facts of the case as outlined in the opinion of the court of civil appeals.
From the facts there recited it seems clear that Marathon was in control of
both the vessel and the sources of gas at the time of the incident. Upon
learning of the incident, the Marathon safety engineer roped off the vessel
and allowed no one else to enter. Marathon was also clearly in control of
the piping to the vessel from which the errant gas presumably escaped.
Moreover, while it is true that in a complex plant escaping gas could be
due to unforeseeable causes, it does not seem improper for a jury to have
concluded that the gassing of a worker does not ordinarily occur absent
negligence. The supreme court in Marathon Oil seems to have been influ-
enced by an obvious disbelief of the plaintiffs claim of injury. 139 Never-
theless, the case does illustrate the court's willingness to apply a much
more restrictive view of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine than the court's ear-
lier opinion in Bell would suggest.
VIII. DAMAGES
Undoubtedly the most complex damage calculation case to be decided
during the survey period was McDonald v. Bennett. 4o The plaintiff sought
to recover amounts invested by him directly and through his closely held
corporation in the acquisition of stock in a corporation owned by the de-
fendants. Following the stock acquisition, plaintiff's corporation spent ad-
ditional sums attempting to operate the acquired corporation.
Nevertheless, the venture failed, and the acquired corporation went into
bankruptcy. The plaintiff alleged claims of common law fraud, breach of
contract, wrongful interference with contract, slander of title, and wrongful
acceleration of debt. The trial court entered judgment in excess of
$500,000 for plaintiff. The Fifth Circuit found the award excessive, how-
ever, and ordered remittitur.141
The court was first faced with the issue of whether a sole shareholder is
entitled to recover damages sustained by his corporation. The individual
plaintiff had purchased the stock of the defendant's corporation in his own
name with funds belonging to his closely held corporation. In addition,
the individual had caused his corporation to spend additional sums in the
venture. The individual plaintiff sought to recover in his own right all
139. The supreme court could not reverse on this ground because some evidence existed
to support the jury's finding that the plaintiff's preexisting medical conditions were aggra-
vated by the gassing. The court nevertheless noted at length that the doctor who examined
the plaintiff testified that the plaintiffs aggravated problems "could have been [caused by]
somebody's perfume for all I know." 632 S.W.2d at 573. Moreover, the court noted that the
plaintiff's preexisting problems included:
a neck disc injury; four broken ribs; a knife wound in the chest; sinus and
allergy problems that resulted in a nasal polypeptomy; high blood pressure;
various problems related to being overweight; severe depression requiring hos-
pitalization and use of at least fifty-one electric shock treatments; chronic...
anxiety attacks; twenty years of smoking at least one pack of cigarettes a day;
and drinking eight to ten beers a day.
Id. at 573 n.2.
140. 674 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir. 1982).
141. Id at 1092.
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sums expended by his corporation. 142 The trial court allowed the recovery.
The defendants argued on appeal that only the corporation was entitled to
recover amounts spent by it.
The Fifth Circuit noted the general Texas rule that an action to redress a
wrong to a corporation cannot be maintained by a shareholder, even if the
shareholder is the owner of all or substantially all of the stock of the corpo-
ration. 143 The plaintiff argued that he fell within an exception to the gen-
eral rule because he, not the corporation, was the party obligated with
respect to the purchased stock. The Fifth Circuit resolved the issue by
permitting the plaintiff to recover the purchase price of the stock.44 In so
doing the court followed the rule stated by the Texas Supreme Court in
Heinrichs v. Evins Personnel Consultants, Inc. Number One 45 that a share-
holder may recover amounts advanced by the corporation on his behalf. 46
The court held, however, that the "slender reed" of Heinrichs did not per-
mit the plaintiff to recover all amounts paid out by the corporation. 47
Only the corporation could recover amounts the corporation paid in its
own behalf. Thus, under the facts presented, the amounts were not recov-
erable which were expended by the closely held corporation in the attempt
to operate the newly acquired corporation successfully. 48
The court next dealt with the trial court's award of damages for mental
anguish the plaintiff suffered as a result of the defendant's alleged im-
proper efforts to collect a debt, which contributed to the demise of the
venture. 49 The appeals court held that the debt at issue, having been cre-
ated in connection with the acquisition of stock, was not a debt incurred by
a "consumer" within the definition provided by the Texas Debt Collection
Act. 150 Although damages for mental anguish alone could be recovered
under that Act, some physical injury must be found for recovery outside of
142. Inexplicably, the plaintiff did not assert claims on behalf of the corporation even
though it was a party to the suit as a result of being joined as a defendant to the
counterclaim.
143. 674 F.2d at 1085; see Stinnett v. Paramount-Famous Lasky Corp., 37 S.W.2d 145,
149 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, holding approved).
144. 674 F.2d at 1086.
145. 486 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. 1972).
146. Id at 936; see also Cullum v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 115 S.W.2d 1196,
1201 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1938, no writ) (general rule does not prevent stockholder
from suing to recover damages for wrongful acts directly against himself as well as against
the corporation).
147. 674 F.2d at 1087.
148. Id.
149. The record reflected that the collection efforts of which the plaintiff complained
consisted principally of steps toward litigation (demand letters, depositions, etc.). One of the
plaintiff's allegations was that he was hospitalized after being subjected to three days of
depositions by the defendant's attorney. Practitioners may receive some comfort from the
court's observation that "[wihile discovery can take the form of a withering ordeal, we know
of no instance in which the stress created by depositions has formed the basis of a recovery
for unreasonable collection efforts." Id at 1089 n.8.
50. Id. at 1089. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.01 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)
defines a "consumer" as "an individual who owes or allegedly owes a debt created primarily
for personal, family, or household purposes."
[Vol. 37
TORTS
the Act.' 5 ' Since the plaintiff had shown no physical injury, the court al-
lowed no recovery.
The court then reviewed the trial court's application of the "benefit of
the bargain" measure of damages recoverable under section 27.01 of the
Texas Business and Commerce Code. 52 Under the facts of the case the
court found that there was no "benefit of the bargain" because the stock
was represented to be worth exactly what the plaintiff had agreed to
pay.153 Since the plaintiff recovered his purchase price under his common
law fraud claim, any recovery under section 27.01 would be duplicative.
Finally, the court considered the appropriateness of the trial court's award
of $150,000 in punitive damages in view of the remittitur that reduced the
plaintiffs actual damage recovery to approximately $100,000. The court
held that the three-to-two ratio satisfied the Texas proportionality
requirement. 5 4
A noteworthy case presenting a fact situation far less complex, but no
less interesting than McDonald, was decided by the Corpus Christi court of
appeals in Berry Contracting, Inc. v. Coastal States Petrochemical Co. 155
Berry had ruptured a natural gas pipeline, which caused the shutdown of
Coastal's refinery for forty-nine hours. Coastal alleged no lost profits, no
lost sales, and no lost contracts by reason of the shutdown, but rather
sought to recover for the loss of the use of its asset for the period of the
closure. The lost use of the asset was to be measured by the reasonable
market value of the use of the asset for the forty-nine hour period. The
jury awarded damages in the amount of $55,988.48.
The court of appeals reversed, however, finding no evidence to support
the jury's damage award. 56 Central to the court's holding was the testi-
mony at trial that it was industry practice for refiners such as Coastal to
enter into refinery service contracts only for periods in excess of thirty
days. Accordingly, the court concluded that there was no "market" for
Coastal's plant for forty-nine hours. The court stated: "Activity in a ready
market may be proven to exist during the time the asset is unusable by
evidence that an opportunity existed to accrue earnings from the asset, and
that its owner would have availed itself of this opportunity."'' 57 The evi-
dence was conclusive that no "ready market" for refining services existed
in the industry for such a short period. 58
151. See Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 19, 273 S.W.2d 64, 65 (1954); Harned v.
E-Z Fin. Co., 151 Tex. 641, 643, 254 S.W.2d 81, 82 (1953); United Fin. & Thrift Corp. v.
Smith, 387 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1965, writ refd n.r.e.).
152. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
153. 674 F.2d at 1091.
154. Id. at 1093; see also Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 665 F.2d 1367, 1377 (5th Cir.
1982) (en banc); discussed ifra at notes 161-68 and accompanying text; Miley v. Oppen-
heimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 331-32 (5th Cir. 1981).
155. 635 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).





The court of appeals in Pickett v. J.J Willis Trucking Co. '59 reaffirmed
the principle that when a chattel has been totally destroyed, as opposed to
merely damaged, no recovery may be had for the loss of the use of the
chattel. In Pickett the plaintiffs truck had been completely destroyed as a
result of the defendant's negligence. In the trial court the plaintiff received
a jury award for the value of the truck and an award of "lost business
profits." The appeals court held the award of profits to be in the nature of
damages for loss of use and therefore not recoverable. 60
In Maxey v. Freightliner Corp. 161 the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc con-
sidered the Texas "proportionality" rule pursuant to which exemplary
damages must bear some reasonable relationship to the amount of actual
damages awarded. The facts of Maxey are discussed above,' 62 but it is
helpful for purposes of the present analysis to recall that the jury had
awarded actual damages of $150,000 and exemplary damages of
$10,000,000. In the trial court the plaintiffs argued that the federal court
was not Erie-bound by the Texas proportionality requirements. By the
time the case reached the full court, however, it was clear that the require-
ment would be followed in diversity cases.' 63
The court in Maxey would not attempt to set a ratio of exemplary dam-
ages to actual damages that would apply to every case. The court noted
the five-factor test used by the Texas courts, 64 but chose not to apply it to
the facts of Maxey.165 Instead, the court merely held that a ratio of ap-
proximately sixty-seven to one was "clearly excessive,"' 66 and the court
"strongly and firmly disapproved" of the award.167 It is significant for fu-
ture cases, however, that the court clearly addressed the award of punitive
damages in a case in which the defendant argued that the practice com-
plained of was in accord with industry practice. The court stated:
159. 624 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
160. Id. at 668-69. The Pickett case is also noteworthy for its holding that a lease clause
allocating the risk of loss from one party to another does not afford protection to the first
party against the consequences of his own negligence. Id at 668. Thus, in this respect, the
court as a matter of "policy," treated the risk of loss provision exactly as an indemnification
provision. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co, 490 S.W.2d 818,
822 (Tex. 1972) (no indemnity protection against one's own negligence unless contract
clearly expresses such a right). The Pickett court cited no authority for its policy determina-
tion, but the careful practitioner will undoubtedly include in risk of loss clauses language
typically incorporated in indemnification clauses in order to protect a party from the conse-
quences of his own negligence.
161. 665 F.2d 1367 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
162. See supra notes 1-25 and accompanying text.
163. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 331-32 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying
Texas law in assessing fairness of exemplary damages).
164. The five factors, in addition to the reasonable proportionality requirement, in evalu-
ating the appropriateness of a punitive damage award are: (1) the nature of the wrong;
(2) the character of the conduct involved; (3) the degree of culpability of the wrongdoer;
(4) the situation and sensibilities of the parties; and (5) the extent to which the defendant's
conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety. First Bank & Trust Co. v. Roach,
493 S.W.2d 612, 619 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ refd n.r.e.).
165. 665 F.2d at 1377-78.
166. Id On remand the district court approved a ratio of three to one.
167. Id at 1379.
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A particular defendant may not be required under Texas law to
bear the burden of a punitive damage award aimed at punishing an
entire industry. The proportionality requirement obviously is in-
tended in part to stop this very kind of broad punitive motive of a
single jury in a single case. As a result, the district court should cir-
cumvent a jury's attempt to discipline an entire industry by way of the
industry's lone representative in a solitary lawsuit.' 68
IX. LOOSE ENDS
A. Collateral Estoppel
In view of Professor Keeton's extensive treatment of the subject of in-
dustry-wide liability in last year's survey issue, 69 only brief mention will
be made here of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hardy v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp. 170 In this asbestos case the district court, applying Erie indica-
tors, held that Texas would adopt a theory of enterprise- or industry-wide
liability in asbestos-related product liability cases by applying notions of
nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel.171 In effect the court granted par-
tial summary judgment for the plaintiff on the basis of earlier litigation to
which the defendants were not parties. Reversing the district court, the
Fifth Circuit first held that the federal law of collateral estoppel, not the
Texas law, governed.' 72 The court then went on to hold that collateral
estoppel could not foreclose trial of the fact issues in Hardy. 173
Practitioners involved in toxic substance or other industry-wide litiga-
tion undoubtedly have already studied Hardy with care. Students of prin-
ciples of collateral estoppel will find Judge Gee's scholarly opinion to
merit close review.
B. Slander of Title
The Texas Supreme Court reversed what one court of appeals case
called "[t]he more recent trend of law"'174 and held in A. H Belo Corp. v.
Sanders'75 that proof of a specific lost sale or sales is required in order to
recover in a slander of title action. 176 Proof of impaired vendability was
not enough. Instead, the Belo court required the plaintiff to point to an
identifiable buyer'who was ready, willing, and able to purchase his lots. 77
In so holding, the court reaffirmed the rule expressed in Shell Oil Co. v.
Howth ' 78 and expressly overruled the court of appeals decision in Walker
168. Id at 1378.
169. See Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 36 Sw. L.J. 1, 1-14 (1982).
170. 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982).
171. 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1359 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
172. 681 F.2d at 337.
173. Id at 348.
174. Ellis v. Waldrop, 627 S.W.2d 791, 797 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth), writ refdnr.e.
per curiam, 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 336 (May 26, 1982).
175. 632 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1982).
176. Id. at 146.
177. Id. at 145.
178. 138 Tex. 357, 366, 159 S.W.2d 483, 490 (1942).
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C Invasion of Privacy
Two cases decided during the survey period discuss the cause of action
for invasion of privacy. In Barr v. Arco Chemical Corp. 180 the federal dis-
trict court held that an employee's secret tape recording of a meeting with
representatives of his corporate employer did not give rise to a cause of
action for invasion of privacy on behalf of the corporation.' 8' Although
the basis for the court's ruling is not clear, a reading of its opinion suggests
that the court concluded that under Texas law the tort of invasion of pri-
vacy is personal in nature and does not extend to a corporation.
In Palmaier v. Beck182 the landlord of the plaintiffs son accepted a
check in the amount of $310 from the plaintiff for the son's past due rent.
Fearing that the check would be dishonored by the plaintiffs bank, the
landlord called the bank, represented himself to be the plaintiff, and was
told the amount of money in the plaintiffs account. The defendant then
deposited enough money in the plaintiffs account to make the check good
and cashed it. The plaintiff sued the bank and landlord for invasion of
privacy.183 The court of appeals held that the plaintiff had no cause of
action for invasion of privacy, 8 4 stating that it found no Texas case hold-
ing that there was a cause of action under facts similar to those presented.
It placed particular emphasis on the fact that the landlord did not reveal
the status of plaintiffs bank account to third parties.18 5
It appears that Palmatier was wrongly decided. Billings v. Atkinson, 186
in which the tort of invasion of privacy was first recognized in this state,
did not establish a requirement that an invasion of an individual's private
business and personal affairs must be followed by a publication of those
affairs by the defendant before a cause of action arises. Moreover, in Gon-
zales v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 187 the court of appeals expressly
recognized the form of the invasion of privacy tort that involves the
"[i]ntrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or into hisprivate af-
fairs." 8 8 Gonzales and the authorities cited therein offer ample support
for the existence of a cause of action on behalf of an individual whose
private banking and financial affairs are invaded by a person falsely repre-
senting himself to be the individual whose privacy is invaded.
179. 540 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ).
180. 529 F. Supp. 1277 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
181. Id. at 1283.
182. 636 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982,.no writ).
183. The plaintiff apparently did not allege a cause of action under the Texas Debt Col-
lection Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11 (Vernon Supp. 1982). It would seem,
however, that the landlord violated § 5(a) of that Act, which prohibits a debt collector from
using a false name while engaged in the collection of a debt.
184. 636 S.W.2d at 578.
185. Id. at 577.
186. 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973).
187. 555 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).
188. Id at 221 (emphasis added).
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D. Inducing Breach of Contract
An employee acting in his employer's best interest is privileged to in-
duce his employer to breach a contract with a third party so long as he
does not use wrongful means. 189 The court of civil appeals in Eloise Bauer
& Associates, Inc. v. Electronic Realty Associates, Inc. 190 engrafted the ex-
ception that the privilege does not apply if the employee is acting to fur-
ther his own interests rather than those of his employer. 91 This exception
holds true, according to the court, even when the employee is found to
have acted within the course of his employment. 92
E. "Puffing"
In Dowling v. NADWMarketing, Inc. 193 the Texas Supreme Court held
that an advertised "buy-back" agreement contained in a newspaper ad
constituted a specific promise and did not constitute mere "puffing."' 194 As
such, the promise could be made the basis of the plaintifis action for
fraud. In so holding, the court reaffirmed that "'[pluffery' is an expression
of opinion by a seller not made as a representation of fact."' 195
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766, 767, 770 (1977 & Supp. 1979); see Lone
Star Steel Co. v. Wahl, 636 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tex. Ct. App.--Texarkana 1982, no writ)
(evidence of malice necessary for recovery in actions for interference with future contracts).
190. 621 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.).
191. Id. at 203.
192. Id
193. 631 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. 1982).
194. Id at 729.
195. Id
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